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Signed into law on August 8, 2014, the Assessing Progress in Haiti Act (APHA) seeks to “measure 
the progress of recovery and development efforts in Haiti” since the devastating earthquake of 
January 2010. Conceived in response to widespread concerns regarding the mixed results and 
opacity of postquake relief and reconstruction efforts, the APHA’s key actionable component is its 
reporting requirement instructing the US State Department to produce four annual reports with 
detailed information on the status of US aid programs in Haiti. If properly executed, these reports 
should greatly enhance transparency and accountability around the $3.6 billion that the US 
government has allocated for Haiti aid since the earthquake.   
 
This review provides a description of the APHA and its objectives, offers a quick overview of the 
contents of the two State Department progress reports published so far, and identifies significant 
omissions and deficiencies in these reports, focusing on the second report (for 2015). While the 
reports have proven to be useful tools for understanding how US assistance funds are used in Haiti, 
there are a number of shortfalls worth highlighting: 
 
 Incomplete information: There is a significant quantity of missing data at the subprime level, 
equivalent to 34 percent of the $300 million awarded to subprime partners. In addition, there 
are many vague terms and assertions that require more context and details to be fully 
understood. 
 No clear links between projects and outcomes: The report fails to provide information about 
what benchmarks and goals have and have not been met at the project level, despite 
providing numerous other details (amounts expended, identity and location of subprime 
partners, etc.). 
 No clear picture of who the beneficiaries of US assistance are: The report provides very little 
information regarding who (e.g., location or demographics) the beneficiaries of US assistance 
programs are. 
 Scant information on US coordination with Haitian and international entities: The APHA 
instructs the State Department to provide a description of US efforts to “consult and engage 
with the Government of Haiti ministries and local authorities on the establishment of goals 
and timeframes, and on the design and implementation of new programs….” There is 
relatively little information in the report describing these efforts, either because the reporting 
is incomplete or because this sort of coordination is limited. 
 No information on nongovernmental capacity building: Though the APHA legislation asks 
the State Department to describe measures taken to strengthen governmental and 
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nongovernmental capacity to undertake US programs, there is no information whatsoever in 
the report on any sort of nongovernmental capacity building. 
 A failure to identify mistakes and lessons learned: The most concerning shortcoming of the 
State Department reports is the fact that they present glowing descriptions of progress that 
are difficult to reconcile with realities on the ground. The reports’ failure to identify errors 
and shortfalls in the implementation of assistance programs or to discuss measures taken to 
address these problems undermines the purpose of the APHA report and the objective of 
providing “transparent post program evaluations.” 
 
Finally, Haitian civil society groups were contacted to register their feedback regarding the APHA 
report. This effort was greatly limited by the fact that Haitian groups are largely unaware of the 
APHA reports, suggesting that USAID and the State Department have done little to familiarize 
groups with the reports. In addition, no part of the reports has been translated into French or 
Kreyòl, rendering them inaccessible to the vast majority of Haitians. Select sections of the report 
were shared with groups, who provided some feedback and numerous questions in response, all of 
which are included in this review. 
 
The review concludes with a series of recommendations for improving future APHA reports that we 
hope are taken into account by USAID and the State Department.   




On August 8, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Assessing Progress in Haiti Act (APHA), 
first introduced to Congress by Representative Barbara Lee in 2011. This piece of legislation, in the 
words of its drafters, seeks to “measure the progress of recovery and development efforts in Haiti 
following the earthquake of January 12, 2010.” 1 Members of the Haiti Advocacy Working Group 
(HAWG), a group of US-based organizations that came together immediately after Haiti’s 
devastating earthquake, provided key input to US legislators during the drafting of this legislation 
and strongly supported its passage in the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
 
Over two years have passed since the enactment of the APHA, and HAWG members, while 
recognizing the significant advances that have been made, consider that more can be done to ensure 
that the APHA is an effective tool for strengthening transparency and accountability around the 
over $3.6 billion that the US government has allocated for Haiti aid since the earthquake.  
 
The key actionable component of the law is its reporting requirement, instructing the US State 
Department to produce four annual reports providing detailed information on the status of US aid 
programs in Haiti — underway or completed since the enactment of the law — as well as on any 
changes to the US government’s aid strategy in Haiti. 
 
Since the passage of the APHA, the State Department has produced two such progress reports. The 
first report, providing a status of US aid programs in Haiti at the end of 2014, was posted on the 
State Department’s website in early 2015. 2 The second report was published in late December of 
2015. 3 
 
The following review will provide a brief description of the APHA and its objectives and then focus 
on the second report mandated by the legislation, looking at what improvements have been made 
since the first report and where there are still serious gaps and deficiencies in the State Department’s 
assessment of US aid efforts. This analysis will also discuss feedback from Haitian partners regarding 
the 2015 APHA report and will conclude by offering concrete recommendations on how to make 
the progress reports more complete, clear, and user-friendly, and on how to better implement key 
policy guidelines. 
  
                                                 
1 US Congress (2013). 
2 US State Department (2014). 
3 US State Department (2015). 
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What is the Assessing Progress in Haiti Act? 
 
The APHA arose from profound concerns — raised by Haitian civil society groups, Haitian diaspora 
organizations, international Haiti advocates, and by the media — regarding the very mixed results 
and opaque nature of international relief and reconstruction efforts following Haiti's devastating 
2010 earthquake. Scathing General Accounting Office (GAO) reports on US infrastructure 
programs (the planned port in the North of Haiti and the postquake housing programs) published in 
2013 created added impetus for establishing stronger accountability mechanisms. 4 In a rare show of 
bipartisan unity, members of the Congressional Black Caucus, led by Barbara Lee, together with 
leading Democrats and Republicans from the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, worked together to pass the APHA. 
 
The centerpiece of the legislation is its reporting requirements, which are both far-reaching and quite 
specific, and require that the State Department provide both quantitative and qualitative descriptions 
of aid programs. The sheer mass of information — organized into 17 attachments for the first 
report, and 15 attachments for the second report — is by no means easy to publish in a manageable 
and coherent form. But perhaps the greatest challenge involves having the State Department 
perform a function that it doesn't frequently engage in, or at least not publicly: applying a critical lens 
to foreign assistance operations. 
 
The second salient feature of the legislation is the manner in which it sets forth important policy 
parameters — both in its policy section and in its reporting requirements — including certain 
policies that were not previously in place, at least not officially. For instance, the “Statement of 
Policy” (Section 3) calls for long-term capacity-building support for both Haiti’s government and 
civil society, the provision of “timely and comprehensive reporting on goals and progress, as well as 
transparent post program evaluations and contracting data” and the prioritizing of “local 
procurement of goods and services.”  
 
Similarly, the APHA’s reporting requirements (Section 5) promote specific policy prescriptions for 
US Haiti assistance, as when the law calls for “a description of mechanisms for communicating the 
progress of recovery and development efforts to the people of Haiti, including a description of 
efforts to provide documentation, reporting, and procurement information in Haitian Creole,” or 
for “a description of United States efforts to consult and engage with Government of Haiti 
ministries and local authorities on the establishment of goals and timeframes.” Thus, the APHA 
                                                 
4 US Government Accountability Office (2013). 
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effectively mandates the creation of new mechanisms of communication and coordination with 
Haitian authorities and civil society groups. 
 
If properly implemented, these policy guidelines combined with the transparency and accountability 
mechanisms found in the APHA’s reporting requirements could pave the way for major reform of 
US assistance programs in Haiti. 
 
However, while the implementation of the APHA represents significant progress, the State 
Department’s compliance with reporting requirements and with the law’s policy guidelines is still far 
from optimal, as will be demonstrated. 
 
 
What the APHA Reports Help Us Understand 
About US Aid Programs in Haiti 
 
There is no doubt that the two APHA reports published so far have proven to be useful tools for 
understanding how US assistance funds are used in Haiti. They have provided an unprecedented 
amount of information about what is occurring in US assistance to Haiti at the subprime level. 
Typically, transparency around US foreign assistance only extends to USAID’s primary partners — 
i.e., the contractors and grantees that are the direct recipients of US assistance funds.5 Generally 
USAID provides little or no public information regarding subprime partners, i.e., companies or 
organizations that receive US funds channeled by primary partners. It is often these subprime agents 
that are most directly involved in the implementation of aid programs.  
 
However, APHA requires the State Department to report on how funds are being used at both the 
prime and subprime levels of aid implementation, and attachment B of both the 2014 and 2015 
APHA reports provide numerous useful details regarding each USAID-funded project in Haiti 
including (in the majority of cases) a quick description of each project; the names of the prime and 
subprime agents working on each project; the start and end dates of each project; the amount of 
funds committed, obligated, and disbursed for each project; and the budget allocated to each 
subprime agent.  
 
As a result of specific suggestions made by congressional offices following the publication of the 
2014 APHA report, attachment B of the 2015 APHA report contains additional details regarding 
                                                 
5 Johnston and Main (2013). 
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each project. This includes “milestones” achieved to date, the country origin of each subprime 
partner (which allows aid monitors to better gauge the amount of funding going to local versus non-
local organizations) and, perhaps most importantly, each project description includes a reference to a 
relevant section of attachment D (the report’s “strategy overview” document) outlining the status of 
strategic objectives for particular assistance programs at different stages in their implementation. 
These additions are helpful in providing a more complete picture of how US aid programs have 
been unfolding in Haiti. However, there are still significant gaps in the information provided, as will 
be explained below. 
 
Other sections of the APHA reports shed significant light on the various dimensions of US 
assistance to Haiti. Attachment D provides a wealth of information regarding aid plans and 
objectives within each of the four pillars of the Haiti aid strategy (infrastructure and energy, food 
and economic security, health and other basic services, and governance and rule of law). Attachment 
E provides responses to a section of the APHA reporting requirements (3(B) – 3(E)) and useful 
information on capacity building and institution-building efforts in support of basic health services; 
on USAID’s postearthquake housing strategy, and how it was completely revised in 2014; on plans 
for improvement to the port of Cap Haitien; a description of risk-mitigating measures to avoid 
exposing US assistance programs to waste, fraud, and abuse; as well as other items. 
 
Attachment F of the 2015 APHA report describes efforts to strengthen Haitian governmental and 
nongovernmental capacity to directly take on US-funded programs. Attachment G briefly describes 
efforts to consult with Haitian authorities regarding design and implementation of aid programs and 
attachment I discusses US supported anticorruption and public accountability efforts in Haiti. 
Additional attachments respond to other sections of the APHA’s reporting requirements, including 
what USAID is doing to promote public-private partnerships and increase the involvement of the 
Haitian private sector in assistance efforts (attachment J); what it is doing to address the needs of 
vulnerable populations in the design and implementation of programs (attachment K); a description 
of the impact that agriculture and infrastructure programs are having on food security and on small 
landholders (attachment L); what is being done to communicate more information regarding US aid 
programs to the people of Haiti (attachment M); what the Haitian government is doing to improve 
its capacity to receive Haitian deportees from the US; and, an assessment of the actions that, 
according to the State Department, need to be taken by Haitian authorities in order to move forward 
with the postearthquake strategy jointly agreed to by the US and Haitian governments (attachment 
O). 
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Though these various sections of the APHA report furnish useful and often previously unknown 
details regarding US assistance to Haiti, a lot of key information is still missing, as will be explained 
in the next section. 
 
 
An Incomplete Picture of US Haiti Assistance 
 
This overview of the deficiencies and shortcomings encountered while reviewing the 2015 APHA 
report will identify specific sets of problems and provide illustrative examples. Among other issues, 
the report presents incomplete information (missing data and vague descriptions), a failure to link 
projects with outcomes, and a failure to identify lessons learned. Overall, the report leaves the 
impression that its authors are more concerned with superficially complying with specific reporting 
requirements (checking boxes) and with presenting the most positive picture possible of US 
assistance than with providing the public with an honest, rigorous assessment of the status of aid 
programs in Haiti.  
 
 
1. Incomplete Information 
 
Two types of omissions stand out in the APHA report. First, there are easily identifiable holes in the 
data, particularly in attachment B. Second, there are, in many instances, vague terms and assertions 
that are virtually meaningless without more details.  
 
As discussed previously, attachment B, the section of the APHA report with the most 
comprehensive information on assistance on the project level, includes more useful details in the 
second (2015) report than in the first (2014) report. However it still has a great deal of incomplete 
data. 
 
In response to suggestions made by Congressional members, the State Department has published 
additional information on the use of subprime awardees in attachment B. Notably, data on the 
country location of the headquarters of subprime partners was provided for the first time, allowing 
an analysis of the amount of local procurement taking place, and of the use of local contractors. 
However, a significant amount of this data is still missing. Of the roughly $300 million that the 
report indicates was awarded to subcontractors, 34 percent is listed as “N/A” or “not available.” In 
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these instances, there is often no information on the subprime awardee, nor is a project description 
provided, nor is there any explanation of why this information isn’t available. 
 
Of perhaps greater concern are the many vague terms and assertions in the report that leave the 
reader guessing about important details regarding US assistance programs. A few quick examples: 
 
• Attachment E states that USAID provided “shelter solutions” for around 328,000 of 
those displaced by the 2010 earthquake, but fails to offer details on what these 
“solutions” might be. Does a “shelter solution” signify a sustainable, long-term remedy? 
Can it be as little as a tent or even a tarp? Does it include rental vouchers? These details 
are critical to understanding what the real impact of USAID’s housing programs may 
have been.  
• Attachment F, which describes US-supported local capacity-building efforts, mentions 
that the US Treasury has embedded technical advisors in Haiti’s Ministry of Finance to 
“improve public financial management and economic governance” but fails to tell us 
who these advisors are, whom they report to, and what tasks they are involved in. Nor is 
there any information regarding “technical assistance” provided to other ministries and 
government offices. 
• Attachment L states that US assistance has contributed to “strengthening of markets” 
for Haitian agriculture, without telling us whether these are local markets or international 
markets. Italso discusses linking Haitian farmers with buyers, without any details of 
whether these buyers are Haitian or foreign. These are important details for those 
wishing to have a clearer picture of whether US agricultural assistance is focused on 
building external or internal markets for Haitian farmers, or both. 
• Attachment M asserts that the USAID Mission in Haiti “translates into French and 
Creole information relevant to local stakeholders.” It would be helpful to know what 
information is considered “relevant” here, especially as Haitian civil society groups that 
were contacted have criticized what they view as the opacity of US assistance efforts in 
Haiti (as will be discussed further in the last section of this report). 
 
 
2. No Clear Link Between Projects and Outcomes 
 
As mentioned earlier, the APHA report’s attachment D provides information on the objectives and 
real achievements that USAID reports having made within each of the four strategic pillars of the 
postquake Haiti aid strategy. This attachment — which contrasts 18-month goals with 18-month 
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outcomes, and 5-year goals withthe current status of aid efforts — offers probably the closest thing 
to a critical review of where assistance programs have succeeded in achieving predetermined goals 
and where they have fallen short. It looks at each “strategic component” within the Haiti strategy 
and contrasts the 18-month goal of each component with the actual 18-month outcome, and the 5-
year goal with the current status of the component (as of September 30, 2015). 
 
While there is much useful information that gives a sense of where USAID assistance efforts have 
been relatively successful and where they have fallen short of goals, the “strategic components” and 
“strategic objectives” often cover broad areas of assistance (e.g., “shelter solutions for Internally 
Displaced Persons”) and the descriptions of outcomes and current status are often exceedingly 
vague (e.g., “The USG has met and is in the process of exceeding the goal for this area”). 
 
Perhaps the biggest issue here, for those hoping for a detailed account of whether benchmarks and 
goals are being met, is the fact that the APHA report fails to provide this information at the project 
level. The obvious place to do this would be in attachment B, which provides many other useful 
(though sometimes incomplete) details at the project level, as described above. With this 
information, it would be possible to form an idea of which contractors and grantees have succeeded 
in meeting benchmarks and goals and which haven’t. 
 
Last year, members of the US Congress requested that “future reports provide further details in the 
list of projects [in attachment B], including … projects’ relation to the benchmarks and goals 
outlined elsewhere in [attachment C of] the report.” It appears, however, that there has been little 
effort to accomplish this apart from references to sections of attachment D that are not project-
specific and instead cover broader aid areas. 
 
There is also no information on the sustainability of specific projects. For example, many projects 
listed have long been completed, but the reader has little idea what, if any, enduring impact they 
have had. The clear intent of the APHA is to increase accountability and transparency in US foreign 
aid to Haiti, but without any information on the success or failures of specific contractors and 
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3. No Clear Picture of Who the Beneficiaries of US 
Assistance Are 
 
Another piece of information frequently missing throughout the APHA report is a proximate 
identification of the beneficiaries of US assistance, e.g., where they are located and what 
demographics they belong to.  
 
This is the case throughout the description of US assistance projects in attachment B, where there is 
no sort of information on the beneficiaries of the programs. It is also the case in other sections of 
the report where there is generally little or no information on beneficiaries beyond sheer numbers. 
 
For instance, in attachment L, USAID reports that “Feed the Future” (FTF) programs will benefit 
approximately 80,000 farmers. However, "farmers" is not a homogeneous group and, since there is 
no description of the criteria for selecting project beneficiaries or the demographics of these 
farmers, there is no indication if the 80,000 farmers include the poor farmers, individuals, and 
members of farming associations for whom FTF funding would represent seed money for new 
investments. It is also unclear if project beneficiaries have evolved since the earthquake, or if 
building the capacity of smallholder farmers over time so that they can successfully access USAID 
funding is key to the strategy. Having this information would allow the reader to better ascertain if 
USAID prioritizes the democratization of access to aid to the same degree as cost-efficient project 
outcomes, and that it is meeting the APHA policy requirement of building “the long term capacity 
and civil society and reflects the priorities and needs of both women and men so that they may 
participate equally and to their maximum capacity” (Section 3).   
 
 
4. Scant Information on US Coordination and Consultation 
with Haitian and International Entities 
 
A particularly glaring problem affecting postquake relief and reconstruction efforts, as reported by 
many media outlets and Haiti observers, was the lack of coordination between public and private 
international aid organizations and between these organizations and Haitian government agencies. 
This lack of coordination led to frequent duplication of efforts, inefficient aid delivery, and a lack of 
cohesion and effective pooling of resources, among other serious problems. This is almost certainly 
one of the reasons that led the drafters of the APHA to ask the State Department to provide “a 
description of United States efforts to consult and engage with Government of Haiti ministries and 
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local authorities on the establishment of goals and timeframes, and on the design and 
implementation of new programs under the Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy” (Section 5). 
 
Attachment G of the APHA report provides an informative breakdown of some of the key areas 
where the US government is coordinating assistance efforts with the Haitian government. The 
document makes mention of ongoing collaboration with the Ministry of Public Health and 
Population and unidentified local mayors. Attachment F describes other joint efforts undertaken 
with the Haitian National Police, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, the Minister Delegate of 
Peasantry, the National Unit of Abagrangou, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the 
Management and Human Resources Office.  
 
While these bilateral cooperation efforts appear to be significant, it is disappointing to note that the 
APHA report presents scant additional details on the involvement of Haitian institutions, or even 
merely on the consultation of Haitian institutions in the development of assistance programs that 
touch on areas of intervention of state agencies.  
 
To take one example, attachment L describes assistance programs that involve significant 
infrastructure projects to assist Haitian farmers, but there is no mention of coordination with Haiti’s 
Ministry of Agriculture. In the same attachment, there are descriptions of USAID’s work with 
“water users associations to build their capacity to manage irrigation systems and manage any 
disputes related to association management or allocation of irrigation water.” Water use 
management in Haiti is a critical issue due to extremely underdeveloped or deteriorated 
infrastructure, and due to severe water access problems.  
 
Haiti’s National Directorate for Water Supply and Sanitation (called DINEPA after its French 
acronym) is the public institution tasked with regulating service and coordinating donor assistance. 
The international community has recognized the critical importance of DINEPA’s role in improving 
water infrastructure and the importance of strengthening the institution. Unfortunately, many 
organizations working in water and sanitation fail to interface with DINEPA, in effect undermining 
the agency’s work. It would be helpful for the State Department to provide information regarding 
the nature of interactions between USAID and DINEPA, if they did occur, including any successes, 
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5. No Information on Nongovernmental Capacity Building 
 
One of the main goals of US assistance in Haiti, as laid out in the APHA’s Statement of Policy 
(Section 3) is to promote “efforts that are led by and support the people and Government of Haiti at 
all levels so that Haitians lead the course of reconstruction and development of Haiti….” 
Accordingly, the APHA asks the State Department to “provide a description of measures taken to 
strengthen, and United States Government efforts to improve, Haitian governmental and 
nongovernmental organizational capacity to undertake and sustain United States-supported recovery 
programs.” 
 
The State Department’s response to this reporting requirement can be found in attachment F, which 
lists a series of bilateral cooperation projects with government agencies (mentioned in the previous 
section). As discussed previously, these efforts are noteworthy, yet it is concerning that the State 
Department isn’t reporting on more systematic consultation of Haitian public entities in the 
development of assistance programs. Failure to do this ultimately undermines capacity-building 
efforts. 
 
It is particularly concerning to note there is no mention in attachment F of nongovernmental 
capacity-building efforts, despite the explicit reporting requirement to describe these efforts. Does 
this signify that the US government has no programs to strengthen the capacity of local 
organizations, despite the policy priority of carrying out local procurement whenever possible? 
 
It is clear that much more needs to be done in the area of capacity building. In the seven years since 
the earthquake, little progress has been made on disaster response and recovery, with the disaster 
response still carried out in large part by international organizations. It is unclear how progress is 
being tracked in this area and if there are efforts to improve the strengthening of Haiti’s disaster 
preparedness and response mechanisms. Following Hurricane Matthew, RNDDH (the National 
Human Rights Defense Network) reported:  
 
The Departmental Centers for Emergency Coordination (COUD) and Municipal Emergency 
Operation Center (COUM) could not meet the needs of affected populations. Today, these 
structures are crumbling under the weight of meetings with humanitarian agencies but they 
are unable to effectively coordinate responses. Moreover, some Mayors’ offices have been 
chosen to receive help from central government while others were ignored.6 
  
                                                 
6 National Human Rights Defense Network (2016). 
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6. A Failure to Identify Mistakes and Lessons Learned 
 
A rosy view of the impact of US assistance permeates the APHA report from the opening lines of 
the report summary: “US foreign assistance has helped Haiti transition from a period of disaster 
relief to sustainable long-term development focused on job creation and reconstruction.” This is an 
extraordinary assertion given that, regardless of USAID’s relative achievements, it flies in the face of 
reality, as depicted by social and economic indicators. In recent years there has been a severe decline 
in agricultural production (the main job creator in Haiti) and economic growth has declined.7 The 
World Food Program has noted that food insecurity is higher than ever.8  
 
Throughout the APHA report, there are glowing descriptions of progress that are difficult to 
reconcile with realities on the ground. Little in the report’s descriptions of US Haiti assistance 
programs suggests that any of these programs have experienced or are experiencing any serious 
difficulties, despite numerous external reports (including those of the US General Accountability 
Office) indicating otherwise.9  
 
The APHA report’s failure to identify previous mistakes and lessons learned is perhaps one of its 
greatest limitations. One example that stands out is the issue of housing. Though the report notes, in 
attachment E, that there has been a “shift away” from permanent shelter programs, there is no 
information as to why that is the case. The US government initially planned to build thousands of 
new, permanent homes. The goal was eventually reduced, from 15,000 to 2,600, though this revision 
of objectives is not documented in any of the attachments to the current report.10  
 
There is also no mention of the fact that two US-based contractors that were awarded contracts to 
prepare the land and build 750 houses in Caracol were barred from receiving further government 
contracts for faulty work and billing related to the development.11 There is no mention of any 
disciplinary action, no mention of the contractors responsible, and no mention of how this impacted 
the decision to change strategy related to housing, or how any lessons have been learned. The 
houses in question required millions of dollars in repairs and, as of this writing, are still being 
worked on. 
 
                                                 
7 Famine Early Warning Systems Network (2016).  
8 Haitian National Coordination for Food Security and World Food Programme (2016). 
9 US Government Accountability Office (2015).  
10 Ibid (2013).  
11 Johnston (2015a), Johnston (2015b).  
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In other sections of the APHA report, its authors recognize that objectives have had to be revised, 
but little explanation for the revisions are provided. For instance, attachment L notes that USAID 
reduced by half the targeted number of hectares for agricultural production, and by 20 percent the 
expected number of beneficiary farmers under the “Feed the Future” program. Only short and 
vague explanations — “weather conditions,” “difficulties to properly staff the project” — is 
provided. 
 
To gloss over the problems that USAID has encountered in the implementation of aid programs or 
to brush off these problems with vague explanations defeats the purpose of the APHA report and 
the objective of providing “timely and comprehensive reporting on goals and progress, as well as 




Haitian Civil Society Feedback 
 
As the APHA legislation’s “Statement of Policy” makes clear, a key objective for the US government 
is to ensure that the Haitian government and people become the true leaders of development efforts 
in Haiti. In order to advance this goal, it is imperative for the State Department and USAID to 
actively engage with Haitians and to seek their feedback regarding US assistance programs.  
 
The APHA calls on the State Department to provide “a description of mechanisms for 
communicating the progress of recovery and development efforts to the people of Haiti, including a 
description of efforts to provide documentation, reporting, and procurement information in Haitian 
Creole.” 
 
Attachment M of the APHA report describes the key components of USAID’s communication 
strategy, which include “outreach to local media; and direct communication with local implementing 
partners, civil society, and the Haitian public.” The attachment also discusses how the 
communication strategy was developed based on a Greenberg Quinlan Rosner survey. While these 
are certainly positive measures, the report is unclear on how USAID defines local media or radio, 
and on the location of USAID public events. It would be useful to have details providing an 
understanding of how communication strategies to civil society and the public were shaped as a 
response to the public opinion survey. In addition, it would be useful to know what approaches 
USAID has adopted to ensure that women are equally represented in the consultation process.  
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Ensuring accessibility of information for certain segments of Haitian civil society represents a major 
challenge, in particular with regard to Haitians residing in rural areas. Many rural Haitians have no 
access to the Internet or even national radio stations. Much of the countryside receives information 
by radio, but more specifically through community radio stations, which USAID’s RAMAK 
program supported in the mid-1990s. There is also an overlap between some of those community 
radio stations supported by RAMAK and the ones currently within the SAKS community radio 
network.  
  
Attachment M also mentions the holding of public informational events. Here again it would be 
helpful to know if accessibility issues are addressed. If public events are held exclusively in Haiti’s 
big cities, transportation for those in the countryside becomes a challenge. Efficient outreach — to 
create awareness around the events — and accessibility in terms of location and transportation, are 
essential to reach broad sectors of Haitian society.  
 
In addition, women’s groups have indicated that consultation must specifically target women, often 
in separate women-only spaces, as when they are in mixed-gender groups they are much less likely to 
participate. If their voices are to be included, this would be a crucial strategy for consultation. 
 
 
Civil Society Reactions to the APHA Report 
 
The best resource for Haitians wanting to understand the nuts and bolts of US assistance programs 
and wishing to independently monitor aid efforts is undoubtedly the APHA report. Various partner 
organizations were consulted regarding the contents of the APHA report, which showed  that none 
of them were familiar with it, suggesting that little has been done by USAID to familiarize members 
of civil society with the report. Through conversations with partners it also has become apparent 
that many basic facts about USAID’s strategies, structures, and funding are not being effectively 
communicated with Haitian civil society organizations. 
 
Making at least some sections of the report available in Kreyòl would be a big step toward rendering 
the report accessible and showing Haitian civil society groups that their voices and input are 
important. English-language or even French-language publications are often associated with top-
down imposed development plans by many local groups, especially those that reside in rural areas.  
 
Notwithstanding this major limitation, sections of the report were discussed with various civil 
society organizations, including human rights groups, peasant farming movements, research 
organizations working on development issues, and groups working on the rights of refugees and 
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Agricultural Support/Food Security (Attachment L) 
 
Strides have been made to shift away from external imports of food aid to support for local 
production, but there seems to be a continued disconnect in the understanding of food security 
between USAID and local farmers and the communities to which they belong. Although value chain 
work is important as an alternate source of income for farmers, many farmers’ associations, national 
peasant organizations, and alternative development collectives believe food security is defined as 
being able to produce and consume locally and to not become dependent on imported food 
products. Imported food is extremely expensive in rural areas due to transportation costs. 
Immediately following Hurricane Matthew, many farmers in rural areas prioritized replanting locally 
consumed crops such as sweet potatoes, three-month corn, pigeon peas, etc., in order to regain their 
independence and to move away as quickly as possible from dependence on expensive imports. 
Questions raised by local groups consulted regarding food security projects include: 
 
 How does USAID define food security?  
 What are the value chain crops that are the focus of USAID projects? Why? 
 How are farmers selected to participate in these programs? Were they already producing the 
crop prior to the program? Whom are the crops being sold to, and at what rate are farmers 
being paid for labor and/or crops? 
 
Haiti has been ranked as the country most vulnerable to climate change and is faced with a number 
of environmental issues, such as erosion, deforestation, damaged watersheds, and rapid depletion of 
nutrient-rich topsoil.12 Many local groups recognize these issues and believe that support and 
investment in local production is needed to address some of these issues. In this context, questions 
that arose include: 
 
 What are the inputs being used in these projects? There are concerns over harmful 
pesticides, fertilizers, and GMO seeds.  
 When value chain projects occur, like bananas in the North, what happens to people who 
have been planting on the land prior to the inception of the project? Why does it appear that 
                                                 
12 Slagle and Rubenstein (2012).  
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monocropping is being prioritized by USAID over agroecology when climate change is such 
a pressing and important issue?  
 
 
Governance, Rule of Law, and Election (Specific Projects 
Detailed in Attachment B)  
 
Regarding the completed International Organization for Migration (IOM) project to 
reintegrate returnees for the United States: 
 
There is little to no information about the success of this project and the methodologies of 
reintegration. In addition, there are local groups, such as GARR (the Support Group for Returnees 
and Refugees) that have been working on these reintegration issues for years and continue to do so 
in extremely effective and culturally sensitive ways. At present, with the number of deportations 
from the US increasing, what are lessons learned from these completed activities and has this 
program strengthened the capacity of the government to reintegrate returnees?  
 
Regarding the program on free, fair, and democratic elections, and the 
strengthening of electoral institutions and processes: 
 
The recognition of the need to strengthen Haiti’s electoral institutions and processes is appreciated. 
Although the recent Provisional Electoral Committee (Conseil Electoral Provisoire, CEP) made 
substantial improvements in rectifying many of the problems from the October 2015 elections, the 
timeline to do the amount of work necessary to prepare for the November 2016 elections was 
limited. It seems crucial that support for electoral institutions means institutionalizing a permanent 
electoral council. External support is extremely useful and welcomed, but ultimately elections need 
to be a Haitian affair.  
 
In addition, the groups supported by USAID in these programs are not clearly detailed as to how 
they function and how they define free and fair elections. Some of the specific questions regarding 
the work include: 
 
 What are the approaches to integrating women and those with disabilities into the electoral 
process? 
 What guidelines are given for electoral observation groups that are funded by USAID? 
 What are lessons learned from this work that affected the August 2015, October 2015, and 
November 2016 elections? 
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 How are the civil society groups chosen from among others who do similar electoral 





This report concludes with a series of recommendations that we hope can be taken into account in 
future reports — if not in the 2016 report, which is due to be published soon, then in the 2017 
report, which is the last scheduled report under the APHA legislation. Each of these 
recommendations is based on assessments of shortfalls in the APHA report that were made in 
previous sections of this report. 
 
 
Engaging with Civil Society 
 
 The report lists several ways that USAID consults with civil society; however, it seems to 
take place on an ad hoc basis rather than through a systematic approach. There are other 
USAID country programs (for example, Colombia) that hold open civil society consultations 
in-country and follow up with a similar consultation in Washington for US-based groups. 
This model would be welcomed as a way to ensure more transparent, inclusive participation 
from a wide range of civil society actors. 
 We recommend that the APHA report be presented in one or more public fora in Haiti to 
which a broad array of civil society groups are invited. Additionally, we recommend that key 
sections of the report — including the report summary — be translated to Kreyòl and made 
accessible in hard copy and online.  
 The report should highlight efforts to procure information in French and Kreyòl and 
descriptions of how that information guides the work of the relevant program or project. 
This involves engaging and listening to local civic society organizations, individual citizens, 
and local government officials. 
 
 
Attachment B  
 
 Where data is missing — often with a mention that it is “N/A” (not available) — we 
recommend that an additional effort be made to retrieve and publish this data, and if it isn’t 
retrievable, that a short explanation of why the data isn’t available be included. 
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 We recommend providing further details in the list of projects in attachment B, in particular 
project-level assessments of what has been achieved in relation to predetermined goals and 
benchmarks and, in the case of projects that have concluded, on the enduring impact of 
projects. 
 The attachment is published in an unmanageable PDF format that serves as a barrier for 
outside groups and members of Congress who seek to analyze the data, and also to Haitian 
organizations interested in learning more about how the US government administers its aid 
programs. We recommend that the document be provided in an Excel format so that 





 There is no description of nongovernmental capacity building efforts here, though that is 
one of the reporting requirements in the APHA legislation. If no such efforts are underway, 





 Apply a more critical lens and strive to identify where problems have arisen during the 
implementation of aid programs, and what lessons have been learned and how and where 
these lessons have been applied. 
 Avoid using vague terms and assertions without further explanation of their meaning. (See: 
“An Incomplete Picture,” “1. Incomplete Information.”) 
 Provide more information on the beneficiaries of aid programs, such as which demographic 
sectors they are from, and where they are located geographically. (See: “An Incomplete 
Picture,” “3. No Clear Picture of Who the Beneficiaries of US Assistance Are.”) 
 We recommend that throughout the report there be more descriptions of the coordination 
taking place between USAID and its partners and the Haitian government and other public 
and private aid organizations, in particular instances of coordination with “GOH ministries 
and local authorities on the establishment of goals and timeframes, and on the design and 
implementation of new programs” (Section 5, APHA). (See: “An Incomplete Picture,” 
“Scant Information on US Coordination.”) 
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 It would be useful for the State Department to provide more information on the process by 
which USAID selects and designs assistance programs, and how it seeks input from a variety 
of sources, including relevant Haitian institutional actors and civil society groups. 
 We suggest that, in the course of the coming year, the General Accounting Office publish its 
own assessment of the State Department’s compliance with the APHA reporting 
requirements.  
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